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 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TELECOMS AND ELECTRICITY 
INTERNATIONALIZATION IN THE SINGLE MARKET 
 
Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes and Julio Revuelta López 
 
 
As a consequence of liberalization policies in the European Union (EU), a number of 
formerly inward-looking incumbents in telecommunications and electricity successfully 
transformed themselves into some of the world’s leading Multinationals. The precise 
relationship between liberalization and incumbent internationalization, however, is 
contested. This article tests three persuasive arguments derived from the political 
economy literature on this relationship. The first claims that incumbents most exposed 
to domestic liberalization would internationalise most. The second asserts the opposite: 
incumbents operating where liberalization was restricted could exploit monopolistic 
rents to finance their aggressive internationalisation. The third argument claims that a 
diversity of paths will be adopted by countries and incumbents vis-à-vis liberalization 
and internationalization. Using correlation and cluster analysis of the whole sample of 
EU telecoms and electricity incumbent Multinationals, evidence is found in favour of 
the third hypothesis. Internationalization as a response to liberalization took diverse 
forms in terms of timing and extent and this is best explained using a country, sector 
and firm logic.   
 
Key words: electricity, European Union, internationalization, liberalization, 
telecommunications. 
 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
It was only from the 1980s that the European Commission (EC) started to embark 
seriously on forging market integration in the network industries, particularly in 
telecommunications and electricity, despite the fact it had enjoyed significant legal 
competence in the field since the Treaty of Rome.
1
 The new, liberalized policy 
environment which gradually extended over these two sectors substantially changed the 
business options available to incumbents. In particular, liberalization ‘enabled’ these 
previously inward-looking domestic incumbents to contemplate, and pursue, expansion 
abroad. As a consequence of the new policy environment, dozens of incumbents – 
previously perceived by some politicians as inefficient ‘lame ducks’ fit only for 
privatization during the new economic policy emerging from the 1980s (Crafts 1991) – 
rapidly transformed into highly respected, world class Multinational Corporations. Their 
emergence perhaps provided evidence at last of a new dawn of European ‘international 
champions’, this time not in the traditional industrial sectors (Hayward 1995), but in the 
network industries since, though business reached many corners of the globe, the 
overwhelming bulk of investment was in other EU countries (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-
Fuentes 2007). The policies which underlined their emergence could be understood as a 
response to a concern that European business, including network industries, had to 
adapt to new technological and competitive challenges from the United States, Japan 
and beyond. Market integration in the network industries, it was anticipated, would 
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 Services of General Economic Interest figured in the Treaty of Rome as exceptions to 
competition policy where this threatened general interest provision. See Clifton, Comín 
and Díaz-Fuentes (2005). 
result in a smaller number of more competitive firms better able to confront global 
challenges. From the 1990s, a significant number of these incumbents internationalized 
and now figure not only as some of Europe’s but also the world’s largest Multinationals. 
EDF, Telefónica, E.ON, Deutsche Telekom, France Télécom and RWE ranked in the 
world’s top 25 non-financial Multinationals in 2006 (UNCTAD 2008). Fifteen years 
earlier, none of these firms figured in the top 100 ranking. Given this development, it 
would appear that European policy-makers met with some success. 
 
Now, liberalization was a ‘prerequisite’ of incumbent internationalization, because it 
reduced or removed previous restrictions on investment and ownership across borders. 
Internationalization would not have been prioritised or even permitted when 
nationalized incumbents were domestic monopoly public service suppliers. However, 
the precise relationship between incumbents’ internationalization and liberalization is 
highly contested. Considerable tension has been generated around the perception that 
some incumbents embark on aggressive internationalization strategies in other countries 
which are relatively more exposed to liberalization - even daring to take over ‘their’ 
national ‘jewel in the crown’ - whilst the ‘aggressors’’ home governments delay or 
restrict liberalization in that sector. While this perception could generate disquiet in any 
industry, it is particularly alive in energy and communications, which have long been 
considered of national strategic, economic and social importance. Indeed, far from their 
strategic role becoming obsolete in the twenty-first century, new modes of terrorism 
have used network industries to organise (communications) and deliver (transportation 
and postal services) terror. For market integration to be successful, it is essential that a 
level-playing field is created and that it is perceived that all players stick to the rules of 
the game. To this end, common liberalization deadlines are set, and the EC uses various 
disciplinary instruments to ‘punish’ non-compliers. The problem of ‘asymmetric 
behaviour’ has been partially addressed in the drafting of the new electricity directive 
(EC 2009) through the so-called ´Gazprom clause’ which stipulates prospective 
acquisitions by vertically integrated firms can be blocked if the target incumbent has 
unbundled. In practice, liberalization as a process is rarely implemented identically in 
different settings: the way that policy is understood, and the speed and depth of its 
implementation, invariably differ. Political economists ascribe the different ways in 
which a policy such as liberalization is implemented on the ground to the various and 
multiple pressures States receive from businesses, trade unions, NGOs, as well as the 
extent to which the State can respond (Smith 2001; Thatcher 2001; Henisz and Zelner 
2006). Purposeful delay - or the perception of purposeful delay – could bring market 
integration to a stand-still (‘why should we open up, with all the political headaches it 
involves, if they aren’t?’).
2
 Thus, the question of States’ and firms’ responses to 
liberalization cuts to the heart of the political economy of the integration process.  
 
There are several persuasive arguments in the political economy literature on the 
relationship between internationalization and liberalization. Three main approaches will 
be tested here. The first argument underlines the logic of EC policy in this field: sectoral 
liberalization leads to the erosion of the incumbents’ market share, exposing managers 
to the ‘cold winds’ of international competition. Fearful of being left behind in the 
‘race’ to internationalization - investment opportunities are limited in these sectors - 
managers are pressurised to exploit firm economies of scale and know-how in new or 
more lucrative markets abroad. So, faster, deeper liberalization at home is associated 
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 This tension was expressed during interviews by the authors with national regulators 
during July 2008. 
with greater incumbent internationalization. The second argument is less optimistic: 
incumbent managers, faced by the challenges presented by liberalization, will lobby 
government to restrict or delay liberalization at home whilst, simultaneously, exploit 
opportunities opened up by relatively earlier liberalizing countries abroad. High-risk 
business abroad is supported by ‘softer touch’ liberalization, so greater incumbent 
internationalization is associated with slower and partial liberalization. The third 
argument is more influenced by comparative political economy literature. Liberalization 
is met by rational behaviour of States and firms but, because institutions matter, the 
processes of liberalization will differ. Internationalization, made possible by 
liberalization, will be pursued via different strategies, according to institutional 
circumstances so, national and sectoral responses to liberalization will result in various 
internationalization responses, explained by institutional difference; even if different 
paths are taken towards a similar end point.  
 
Building on a body of scholarship on telecommunications and electricity reform 
(Börsch 2004, Eising 2002, Haar and Jones 2008, Héritier 2002, Murillo 2009, Thatcher 
2001, 2007, Van Kranenburg and Hagedoorn 2008) this article analyses the role of 
liberalization policy in explaining incumbent internationalization outcomes in 
telecommunications and electricity in the EU. Correlation and cluster analysis 
methodology is deployed to analyse all major telecoms (12) and electricity (17) 
Multinationals in the EU plus Norway.
3
 Analysis of these two sectors is justified 
because: of their role in economic growth; they provide critical networks for the 
movement of knowledge and energy required by the Single Market; they still constitute 
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important instruments of the State; and, finally, they constituted key sectors in the 
privatization and liberalization ‘wave’ during the 1990s. After multiple rounds of 
liberalization, it appears much work is left to be accomplished in telecommunications 
and, particularly, electricity, before the Single Market could be understood to be nearing 
completion (Ilzkovitz et al., 2008). In July 2009, the EC ruled E.ON and Gaz de France-
Suez had participated in ‘market sharing’, fining them 553 million each. Previously, in 
2007, Telefónica was forced to pay 152 million euros when the EC ruled it had set 
unfair prices. There are, of course, many other issues that do not end up in highly 
publicised sanctions. 
 
Deeper insight into the role played by liberalization policy in the internationalization of 
incumbents can shed new light on the political economy of market integration. It is 
found here that no causal relationship exists between incumbent internationalization and 
liberalization. Liberalization and internationalization changed the opportunity sets 
available for EU incumbents and their governments, but ‘policy space’ matters. Policy 
space is a fast-moving zone where States and firms ‘embrace’, ‘baulk’ or ‘limp 
forward’. Some of the larger players moved aggressively to ‘swallow up’ smaller or 
less-convinced market players, in a West-East and North-South direction. Diversity is 
encountered, at the country, sectoral and, particularly, firm level. Decisions taken inside 
policy space can have long-lasting consequences on the ways in which the economy is 
structured.  
 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section presents the three 
main arguments on the relationship between incumbent internationalization and 
liberalization and derives hypotheses for competitive testing. The third section 
operationalizes the hypotheses and synthesizes the research design. The fourth section 
provides data on the major EU telecoms and electricity incumbents including 
internationalization. The fifth part contains the analysis divided into two sub-sections, 
telecommunications and electricity. Conclusions follow. 
 
2. THREE HYPOTHESES ON THE ROLE OF LIBERALIZATION ON 
INCUMBENT INTERNATIONALIZATION 
 
There is a vast literature in the social sciences on why firms internationalize. It is a 
daunting task to summarise this literature; here, three main points will be made about 
the state-of-the-art literature in order to contextualise the more specific political 
economy literature which deals with the role of policy on internationalization. It is first 
important to remember that most research on why firms went abroad focused on the 
manufacturing, oil and financial sectors, reflecting the profile of most twentieth-century 
Multinationals. Logically, much less attention has been paid to why firms in network 
industries go abroad, so their recent internationalization is presenting new research 
challenges (UNCTAD 2008, Jakopin 2008). Secondly, the reasons why a firm goes 
abroad are complex and interwoven, and cannot usually be reduced to a single factor. 
Theories or paradigms developed to explain firm internationalization take in multiple 
variables. Despite differences across schools of thought on international business, one 
particularly influential perspective was developed by John Dunning (1989). Briefly, the 
‘OLI’ paradigm locates reasons for internationalization in ‘O’ (firm-specific 
advantages), ‘L’ (country specific advantages) and ‘I’ (internalization). Thirdly, 
scholars are increasingly recognising the role of policy and other institutional factors as 
variables in the internationalization decision, after having been rather neglected 
(Dunning 2009; Spar 2001). Policy considerations would fit broadly into ‘L’, since 
differences in the timing, extent and quality of policies such as liberalization 
implemented in the home and host country constitute part of the business environment 
in which firms operate. Policy is arguably an even more important factor influencing 
internationalization in the so-called ‘heavily regulated’ network industries. Telecoms 
and electricity incumbents did not have international presence to speak of at the 
beginning of the 1990s, and regulatory change, including liberalization, ‘enabled’ this 
internationalization to occur. Attention is now turned to how the relationship between 
liberalization policy and incumbent internationalization is conceptualised in different 
strands of political economy literature in order to derive the hypotheses. 
 
The first two hypotheses are based on political economy arguments. The first argument 
underlies the logic of the Single Market project, as detectable in thousands of EC policy 
documents.
4
 It is also the view expressed by network industry managers in a world-wide 
survey on internationalization drivers (UNCTAD 2008) as well as other academic 
accounts (Stienstra et al., 2004). Liberalization at the sectoral level forces incumbents to 
react and readjust. They increasingly notice how their monopolistic markets are being 
challenged by new entrants, resulting in a decline of their business. They also fear that a 
failure to liberalize domestically will compromise any potential outward expansion, due 
to reciprocity demands, meaning delay could prevent them from entering the 
internationalization ‘race’. Firms that embrace liberalization will be freer to seek out 
better, more profitable business abroad, exploiting their economies of scale. Macro 
policy reform has a direct impact on firm behaviour, therefore, which is assumed to be 
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 Neelie Kroes (2005), Commissioner for Competition explained: ‘Companies that face 
strong competition at home are more likely to become successful on a global scale’. 
rational, uniform and profit-seeking. This perspective is ‘generalistic’ since attention is 
focused on the transformative power of policy and anticipates a common response from 
firms. Little attention is paid to institutional or firm-based differences. It is also 
‘optimistic’, since it anticipates liberalization will have a uniform, lineal path, from 
design to outcome. If firms, States or both attempt to oppose liberalization, supervisory 
and disciplinary instruments can be used to ensure compliance by the EC. This narrative 
represents the ‘hope’ of policy-makers: competitive markets will drive down prices thus 
providing consumers with better services at lower cost. Thus, hypothesis 1 claims that 
the greater a firm is exposed to earlier and deeper liberalization, the more that firm will 
respond to increased pressure on its domestic market by increasingly going abroad in 
search of markets.  
 
Another reading from political economy predicts a different outcome from which the 
second hypothesis is derived (Bonardi 2004; Chari and Gupta 2008, Haar and Jones 
2008, Sarkar et al. 1999). In common with the first approach, liberalization is 
understood as being an important factor when explaining internationalization patterns of 
network industries; firms and States are understood to behave rationally and uniformly; 
institutional aspects are downplayed. The crucial difference is in the direction of the 
linkage between internationalization and liberalization. In a battle for survival, as 
liberalization quickens and deepens, firms, sometimes supported by their States, will 
seek to avoid or restrict liberalization at home. ‘National champion’ policies are a case 
in point: governments may opt to ‘cushion’ national players from the onset of a 
potentially damaging policy in order to shore up valued political support. Highly 
publicised examples include Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi’s stated preference to 
keep Telecom Italia in ‘Italian hands’ and France’s former Prime Minister Dominque de 
Villepin’s ‘patriotisme economique’ pledge to protect eleven ‘strategic’ industries – 
including casinos – from foreign takeover.
5
 States can deliberately implement 
liberalization incorrectly, partially or slowly, giving ‘breathing time’ to domestic 
players to readjust and exploit other markets which opt to open up earlier. State 
protection of industry may be even more likely to emerge in industries such as 
networks, associated historically with the nation in economic, political, strategic and 
social terms. Protection provides a firm with ‘safe’ financial resources derived from 
monopoly rents which can be used to undertake risky international operations. Thus, 
hypothesis 2 argues that greater firm internationalization is associated with relatively 
slower and limited implementation of liberalization.  
 
The third hypothesis is influenced by the comparative political economy and 
institutionalist literature (Hall and Soskice 2001) which focuses on reform in these 
sectors (Börsch 2004, Levi-Faur 2006, Murillo 2009, Thatcher and Héritier 2002). The 
most nuanced of these accounts is Thatcher (2007). This adopts a policy analysis 
approach and argues different paths to reform, explained by institutional differences, 
may eventually lead to relatively similar outcomes. In common with the other two 
perspectives, it is assumed that liberalization is important and firms and States act 
rationally. Institutional and geopolitical differences, however, matter, and significantly 
shape processes and outcomes, hence countries and sectors may embark on different 
paths towards a similar reform direction. So, hypothesis 3 claims that governments and 
firms responded in various rational ways to liberalization, incumbent 
internationalization being one of those responses, and these differences of timing and 
                                                 
5
 Times 18 April 2007  
extent can be explained by institutional differences even if some convergence is finally 
attained.  
 
Testing these three hypotheses is the central aim of this article. However, there are two 
secondary questions that require brief attention: ownership and firm size. Liberalization 
has often been confused with privatization. These two policies are conceptually quite 
different, since liberalization entails introducing competition, whilst privatization means 
more private ownership. Whilst the EC has competence in liberalization policy, it is up 
to national governments to implement privatization (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 
2006). Did privatization influence internationalization? It could be argued that more 
privatization makes a company more visible to its stock-holders, forcing it to be 
efficient and maximise profits, whilst cutting its political ties make the firm more agile 
to move (Megginson and Netter 2001). Thus, the greater a firm is privatised, the more 
likely that firm is to respond to increased pressure on its domestic market by seeking out 
more profitable markets abroad (hypothesis 4). In many ways, hypothesis 4 is the 
corollary of hypothesis 1, in that greater liberalization and deeper privatization form 
part of the reform of the network industries so are seen as going hand in hand. The 
opposite of this argument is the corollary to hypothesis 2. Mergers and Acquisitions are 
often once-off, risky and politically complex operations: board-room politics often 
becomes transformed into ‘high politics’ when potential gains are significant. 
Incumbents with significant political involvement may be at an advantage in that they 
could have access to more information as well as to politicians who could ‘smooth the 
way’ for the operation to take place. Following this logic, firms with significant public 
ownership may be more likely to internationalize more strongly, thanks to interference 
from a political ‘visible’ hand. Thus, less privatization should be correlated to more 
internationalization (hypothesis 5). Finally, firm size could be an important factor 
enabling firm internationalization. For instance, there may be a minimum size that firms 
need to reach before internationalization becomes possible. Hence, firm size is a control 
variable throughout the analysis.  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Four hypotheses predict a lineal and continuous relationship between 
internationalization and liberalization policy (1 and 2), and internationalization and 
privatization (4 and 5), albeit in different directions. If hypothesis 1 is correct, we would 
expect to find correlations between higher levels of firm internationalization with 
deeper and faster implementation of liberalization, in its multiple forms. Hypothesis 2 is 
correct if restricted and more sluggish liberalization implementation was correlated with 
greater incumbent internationalization. As regards internationalization and ownership, 
hypothesis 4 predicts that more privatization will be correlated with greater 
internationalization, and hypothesis 5, less privatization would be correlated with 
greater internationalization. Incumbent size is controlled for throughout. Correlational 
analysis measures the strength of the associations between the independent and 
dependent variables, thus is appropriate to test these hypotheses. Hypothesis 3, in 
contrast, predicts that there is no fixed relationship between the variables; rather, there 
will be multiple paths in terms of the timing and extent towards incumbent 
internationalization and liberalization, which can be explained by institutional 
differences. Cluster analysis is ideal for testing this, since patterns of incumbent 
behaviour are made visible. 
 
4. A ‘SNAPSHOT’ OF RECENT INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EU 
TELECOMS AND ELECTRICITY INCUMBENTS 
 
Before proceeding to competitively test the hypotheses on the relationship between 
incumbent internationalization and liberalization, a sketch of the internationalization of 
major EU telecoms and electricity incumbents is provided. Tables 1 and 2 respectively 
show the major telecoms and electricity Multinationals between 1999 and 2006, ranked 
by revenue in 2006. The ‘Western bias’ of the integration process can be seen since only 
major Western European Multinationals emerged, whilst Eastern Member States were 
generally recipients of this process. Data is provided on the timing and extent of 
internationalization, liberalization and ownership, revenue and employees. Definitions 
and measurements of internationalization, liberalization and privatization require 
explanation. International activity by firms takes two main forms: global alliances or the 
physical extension of the firms’ sales, assets and/or employees abroad. It is this second 
activity that has been of greater importance in telecommunications and electricity, so it 
is this ‘physical’ internationalization that is considered here. Internationalization is 
quantified as foreign revenues as a percentage of overall revenues.
6
 Data on foreign 
operating revenues is derived from annual company reports and Amadeus (2009). 
Liberalization is complex to quantify. The OECD (2009) is perhaps the most 
comprehensive quantitative database of regulation and is used here. OECD 
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 Methodology deployed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) constructs a composite proxy of internationalization combining data on 
sales, employees and assets abroad. When this information is not available, however, 
data on sales, employment or assets abroad only is used. To avoid possible bias that the 
UNCTAD approach could cause, we use here ‘only’ data on sales abroad. 
methodology constructs different sets of indicators for liberalization in 
telecommunications and electricity (Conway and Nicoletti 2006). For 
telecommunications, liberalization is measured in two ways. Firstly, an indicator is 
constructed for ‘Entry Regulation’, meaning to what extent legal systems allow for new 
entrants, 0 being they do not, and 1 being completely.
7
 The second indicator, ‘Market 
Structure’, indicates what market share new entrants enjoy, as a means of gauging the 
extent to which liberalization leads to actual competition. Zero means none and 1 means 
the total market. For electricity, ‘Entry Regulation’ measures the terms and conditions 
for third party access, the extent to which consumers can chose supplier, and the 
existence of a liberalized wholesale market for power. Zero means none, 1 means this is 
fully liberalized. The second electricity liberalization indicator is ‘Vertical Integration’, 
or the extent to which the industry has been unbundled, 1 meaning the industry is 
integrated, 0 meaning it is fully unbundled (Conway and Nicoletti 2006).  Indicators for 
ownership are also included: 0 means full public ownership; 1 means total private 
ownership.  
Table 1 
EU Telecoms Multinationals: Size, Internationalisation and Regulatory Reform Indicators 1999, 2003 and 2006
      Revenues (000 euros)       Employees (000)      Internationalisation         Entry Regulation          Market structure             Privatization
Company Country 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006
Deutsche Telekom Germany  35 325  62 739  77 069  203 268  251 263  248 480 8 38 47 100 100 100 51 64 69 41 57 63
Telefónica Spain  24 458  31 910  66 459  146 619  221 657  232 996 58 38 62 100 100 100 30 39 44 100 100 100
France Telecom France  29 014  51 821  64 952  174 282  148 288  191 036 13 41 47 100 100 100 39 56 60 39 41 57
Telecom Italia Italy  29 425  35 051  40 052  122 682  93 187  83 209 6 20 26 100 100 100 30 49 54 96 100 100
BT UK  35 438  30 359  35 937  136 800  99 900  106 204 7 7 15 100 100 100 63 77 72 100 100 100
KPN Telecom Netherlands  9 729  14 502  15 126  38 550  31 267  26 287 9 20 29 100 100 100 35 64 52 56 81 92
Telenor Norw ay  4 291  7 503  14 201  23 470  26 694  35 600 17 41 64 100 100 100 23 47 49 11 38 46
TeliaSonera Sw eden  8 149  10 108  12 342  40 155  19 450  28 528 10 49 60 100 100 100 36 56 62 15 54 51
TDC Denmark  5 765  7 945  8 390  17 464  24 872  19 010 42 53 48 100 100 100 56 64 61 100 100 100
Portugal Telecom Portugal  3 429  6 490  8 235  16 188  19 207  32 058 9 24 37 33 100 100 21 34 48 88 94 93
OTE Greece  3 622  5 522  7 768  21 588  17 169  17 782 0 19 26 33 100 100 19 50 53 42 66 72
Telekom Austria Austria  3 966  4 460  5 472  19 347  13 890  15 428 0 11 32 100 100 100 28 66 67 13 53 75
Mean 16,051 22,367 29,667 80,034 80,570 86,385 14.9 30.1 41.1 88.9 100 100 35.9 55.5 57.6 58.2 73.6 79.0
Standard Deviation 13,387 19,796 26,493 70,804 84,511 88,366 17.4 15.1 16.0 26.0 0 0 14.0 12.3 8.9 36.6 24.7 20.9
Sources: Elaborated by the authors based on Amadeus (2009), Company' Anual Reports (various years) and OECD (2009).  
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 This is a composite indicator including mobile, trunk and international long distance 
telecommunications services. 
Attention is first turned to the telecoms Multinationals. Pressures to reform 
telecommunications due to technological change, international developments and 
ideological beliefs have been documented elsewhere (OECD 2007). In 2006, there were 
five huge and eight medium-sized EU Multinationals. Interestingly, the ranking of the 
‘giants’ changed between 1999 and 2006. In 1999, BT ranked top, just ahead of 
Deutsche Telekom. But, by 2006, BT’s revenue had stagnated, and was reduced to fifth 
position, having grown much less than the other ‘giants’, whilst the German 
incumbent’s revenue more than doubled, leading the pack. Telefónica ranked fifth in 
1999, but leapt to second place in 2006, after growing 80% during this period. It can be 
seen that much of the growth of the incumbents was fuelled by internationalization. The 
average extent of incumbent internationalization in 1999 was nearly 15%, increasing to 
41% in 2006. Internationalization of the incumbents was uneven both as regards timing 
and extent. Both smaller and larger incumbents were able to internationalise.  In 1999, 
internationalization ‘stars’ included Telefónica (58%) and TDC (42%); by 2006, sales 
abroad exceeded those at home for Telenor (64%), Telefónica (62%) and TeliaSonera 
(60%).  BT was by far the least international of the Multinationals by 2006. As regards 
liberalization, ‘Entry Regulation’ shows that Denmark, Sweden and the UK were ‘first 
movers’ during the 1990s, indeed, their liberalization preceded implementation of the 
EC liberalization directives. The importance of EC directives as regards timing, 
however, can be seen as all other countries reached full ‘Entry Regulation’ by the 1999 
deadline, except those with official extensions: Greece, Portugal and Ireland. The UK 
was consistently the most open market for new entrants (‘Market Structure’). Between 
1999 and 2003, average access to market share for new entrants increased from 35% to 
56%; but this only grew another 2% in the next three years. In 2006, incumbents still 
enjoyed around 43% of market share, though this was uneven. Telefónica enjoyed the 
highest market share (66%), whereas BT only had 28%. Of the ‘big five’, Spain was the 
least open between 1999 and 2006. As ‘first-mover’, Telefónica - enjoying monopoly 
status and having enjoyed significant private ownership from the 1970s since 
nationalization was never completed – was the internationalization pioneer, starting 
very early on, to take advantage of the opening up of Latin American telecoms markets 
as part of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. Privatization was completed earlier on 
in BT, TDC and Telefónica, followed by Telecom Italia. Though telecommunications 
privatization was widespread across the EU in this period, public ownership remained at 
24% on average in 2006, being higher in Deutsche Telekom, France Télécom, Telenor, 
TeliaSonera, OTE and Telekom Austria. 
Table 2 
EU Electricity Multinationals: Size, Internationalisation and Regulatory Reform Indicators 1999, 2003 and 2006
Company Country 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006
E.On Germany 52,016 47,616 72,408 132,930 64,969 80,453 48 41 47 50 83 100 M M M 100 100 100
EDF France 32,057 44,919 60,493 135,448 163,694 156,524 18 29 47 28 94 94 I I M 0 0 25
RWE Germany 45,671 47,470 43,076 155,697 139,535 65,910 23 44 48 50 83 100 M M M 0 0 25
Enel ++ Italy 20,933 30,345 38,513 78,511 64,770 60,085 0 5 14 33 61 94 I U U 0 25 50
Endesa ++ Spain 13,495 16,644 20,774 34,930 26,600 26,948 31 39 48 94 100 100 M U U 75 75 75
Electrabel Belgium 5,859 10,988 14,051 16,439 17,360 16,585 n.a. 28 40 17 61 61 I M M 75 75 75
Iberdrola * Spain 7,504 10,903 11,253 12,653 13,042 16,969 0 12 18 94 100 100 M U U 75 75 75
Scottish Power* UK 6,247 7,626 8,037 15,932 15,490 9,953 0 59 47 100 100 100 U U U 100 100 100
Vattenfall Sw eden 3,268 12,538 16,153 7,991 35,296 32,308 6 64 60 100 100 100 M M M 0 0 0
EnBW Germany 4,470 11,300 13,755 12,581 34,719 20,265 9 12 7 50 83 100 M M M 0 0 25
National Grid UK 2,299 13,592 13,603 3,628 28,940 20,529 0 46 46 100 100 100 U U U 100 100 100
Unión Fenosa Spain 3,270 5,864 6,057 10,785 21,269 17,765 9 34 34 94 100 100 M U U 75 75 75
EDP Portugal 3,954 8,030 9,390 13,992 17,388 13,333 2 19 39 28 100 100 M M M 50 50 50
Essent Netherland 5,164 8,112 6,663 9,852 12,206 10,421 0 18 23 94 100 100 M M U 0 0 0
Dong Energy  Denmark 915 2,489 4,780 572 1,125 2,944 0 30 33 94 100 100 I U U 25 25 25
Fortum Finland 2,448 4,812 4,571 17,461 13,343 8,910 32 64 73 100 100 100 M M M 50 50 50
EVN Austria 1,116 1,340 2,233 2,221 2,608 9,535 0 9 46 33 100 100 I M U 25 25 25
Mean 12,393 16,740 20,342 38,919 39,550 33,496 11.1 32.5 39.4 68.3 92.2 97.1    44.1 45.6 51.5
Standard Deviation 15,920 15,683 20,737 52,160 46,021 38,647 15.0 18.9 16.7 32.4 13.3 9.4    40.0 38.8 33.6
Sources: Elaborated by the authors based on Amadeus (2009), Company Anual Reports (various years) and OECD (2009).
U=Unbundled, M=Mixed, I=Integrated.
Revenues (000 euros) Employees (000) PrivatizationVertical IntegrationInternationalization Entry Regulation
 
We now turn to the EU’s 17 major electricity Multinationals ranked by revenue in 2006 
(Table 2). Technological, economic and ideological factors influencing reform and EU 
responses have been documented elsewhere (Domanico 2007). Again, all incumbent 
Multinationals are from Western Europe. Unlike telecoms, where there is one major 
national incumbent, in electricity, there may be several, due to the organization of the 
sector as regional monopolies or else as a result of unbundling, as in the case of 
National Grid. This fact should not cause sample bias because firms in the same policy 
environment may – indeed do - behave differently. Thomas (2003) predicted that the 
outcome of the Single Market in electricity would be a ‘seven sisters’ oligopoly. Along 
similar lines but for the case of France, Bauby and Varone (2007) argued that one of the 
paradoxes of European market integration was the successful ‘engineering’ of national 
energy giants, EDF and the multi-utility GDF-Suez. By 2006, the EU only had five 
energy giants left: E.ON, RWE, EDF, GDF-Suez
8
 and ENEL. A pessimistic ‘seven 
sisters’ oligopoly now seems over-optimistic. Examining internationalization patterns, 
E.ON recalls Telefónica’s behaviour in that it went international very early on (48% of 
sales were earned abroad in 1999) whilst enjoying monopoly conditions at home. 
Internationalization of incumbents was, on average, 11% in 1999, and 39% by 2006, a 
strikingly similar outcome to the extent of internationalization in telecoms incumbents 
over the same period. International patterns are uneven but it is notable how some of the 
fastest growing incumbents during this period were the medium-sized firms, namely 
Vattenfall, EnBW, National Grid and EDP.  
 
Comparison of the data on progress towards liberalization for telecoms and electricity 
shows how, whilst in telecoms, Entry Regulation was virtually in place by 1999, 
progress was slower in electricity. One convincing reason for the slowness of 
transposition of electricity vis-à-vis telecoms reform has been provided by the argument 
that the first was an intergovernmental process whilst the second was supranational 
(Levi-Faur 1999). So, if by 1999, nearly all countries had liberalized 
telecommunications, there were a number of laggards in electricity. As in telecoms, the 
timing and extent of liberalization was very uneven. The UK was uniquely early in its 
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 Suez took over Electrabel in 2003 and then merged with GDF in 2007. Hollinger 
(2009).  
pre-emption of EC Directives: full liberalization and unbundling were reached as early 
as 1995. The Nordic countries were also early movers to liberalise Entry Regulation, 
though Denmark was the only one to fully unbundle by 2002. These countries had 
historically traded electricity with each other to balance their systems and, in the late 
1990s, they established the Nordic Power Exchange for a single electricity market for 
the four countries. After the UK lead, the path to unbundling was uneven; Spain (2002), 
Italy (2003) and the Netherlands (2004) responded to EC Directives. Other countries, 
particularly France, Belgium, Germany and Portugal moved more slowly. As regards 
ownership, privatization was quite slow during the period, increasing on average from 
44% to 51% of these incumbents. Here, there was huge diversity: in 2006, incumbents 
from Germany and the UK were fully privatised whilst public ownership still dominated 
in Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Austria and Denmark. The 
privatization of incumbent Multinationals went much further in telecoms than in 
electricity. 
 
5. ANALYSIS 
 
The five hypotheses are now tested using correlation and cluster analysis techniques. 
Results are divided into telecoms and electricity.  
 
Telecoms 
 
Correlation between variables using Pearson bivariate correlation, Kendall rank and 
Spearman rank correlation were used to detect the strength of association between 
internationalization and entry regulation, market structure, ownership, size (revenue and 
employees) for 1999, 2003 and 2006. Results are shown in Annex 1. Using Pearson’s 
correlation, in 1999, there is a negative relationship between internationalization and 
public ownership (privately-owned incumbents were more likely to go abroad), though 
this correlation is not apparent applying Kendall and Spearman correlations. However, 
this correlation did not reappear using Pearson in 2003 or 2006. No other significant 
variables were detected which correlated with internationalization, including the two 
indicators for liberalization. So, over this period, indicators on liberalization, ownership 
or size do not explain the extent of incumbent internationalization. No evidence on 
hypotheses 1, 2, 4 or 5 is obtained.  
Table 3 
Internationalisation 
and Market entry
1999 1999 2003 2006
Deutsche Telekom 3 3 4 4
Telefónica 4 2 2 2
France Telecom 3 1 4 4
Telecom Italia 3 1 1 1
BT 3 3 3 3
KPN Telecom 3 1 3 1
Telenor 3 1 2 2
TeliaSonera 3 1 4 4
TDC 4 4 4 4
Portugal Telecom 1 1 1 1
OTE 1 1 1 1
Telekom Austria 3 1 3 4
Valid cases 12 12 12 12
Based on Squared Euclidean Distance and Average Distance among groups
1. Low  internationalisation and low  liberalisation
2. High internationalisation and low  liberalisation
3.Low  internationalisation and high liberalisation
4. High internationalisation and high liberalisation
Internationalisation and Market 
Structure
Cluster Membership* of EU Telecoms Multinationals: Internationalisation and 
liberalisation Market entry 1999, and Market Structure 1999, 2003 and 2006 
 
 
Next, cluster analysis is deployed to search for groups that are found to be similar in one 
or more sets of variables, to test hypothesis 3. All 12 telecoms incumbent Multinationals 
were considered for extent of internationalization, entry regulation and market structure 
for 1999, 2003 and 2006. Results are shown in Table 3. Since all Member States had 
attained complete entry regulation from 1999, this variable is no longer of use and is 
excluded from the analysis henceforth.  
 
The cluster analysis reveals some interesting patterns. Starting with 1999, there are two 
sets of findings: internationalization and entry regulation, and internationalization and 
market structure. Regarding the former, two incumbents – TDC and Telefónica - set the 
pace to internationalise, and which constitute cluster 4. Both incumbents underwent 
significant internationalization and were based in countries where entry regulation had 
been liberalised. The vast majority of incumbents, however, fell into cluster 3; here, 
internationalization is rather slow, whilst entry regulation is liberalised. Portugal and 
Greece predictably fall into a fourth category, cluster 1; where incumbent 
internationalization is slow and entry regulation is officially delayed. 
 
Analysis of internationalization and market structure throws a more nuanced light on 
these results, particularly as regards the strategies of TDC and Telefónica. TDC is left 
alone in Cluster 4, since market share is quite liberalized in Denmark. Telefónica 
uniquely comprises Cluster 2, having embarked on an ambitious internationalization 
programme whilst enjoying a relatively high share of its domestic market. Hence, TDC 
and Telefónica emerge as opposites: the two most international of companies pursued 
this expansion based on different shares of the domestic market. Again, the vast 
majority of incumbents fell into the same category, cluster 1; here, internationalization 
is low, as is market structure liberalization. Exceptions are BT and Deutsche Telekom 
(cluster 3), where internationalization is quite low but market structure has been highly 
liberalized. The clusters in 1999 show clearly that there are no automatic relationships 
between the variables under study, rather, in similar situations incumbents pursued 
different paths toward internationalization.  
 
A number of patterns emerge over the next seven years. Firstly, Telefónica is joined by 
Telenor in cluster 2. As mentioned in section four, Telefónica and Telenor were both 
internationalization ‘stars’ as regards their aggressive pursuit of internationalization. 
Both did so in a context of slower liberalization of market structure. Telenor emulates 
Telefónica’s strategy from 2003. Secondly, ambitious internationalization is now 
pursued by other incumbents this time in the context of a liberalised market structure. 
TDC’s strategy is adopted by TeliaSonera, France Télécom, Deutsche Telekom and, to 
a lesser extent, Telekom Austria, which comprise cluster 4. There is a third group of 
incumbents (cluster 1) which internationalized more slowly, based in countries where 
market structure was less liberalised: Telecom Italia, KPN, Portugal Telecom and OTE. 
Finally, BT alone forms cluster 3, as incumbent internationalization was relatively low 
and where market structure had been highly liberalization. BT’s lower international 
level was due to the fact that much of its initial international activity was sold off after 
its abandonment during firm re-organization.  
 
Electricity 
 
Using the same correlation techniques and periods of time as for telecoms, the extent of 
incumbent electricity Multinationals was analysed, considering entry regulation, vertical 
integration, ownership, revenue and employees. No correlations were detected between 
incumbent internationalization and entry or vertical integration (see Annex). In 1999, 
there is a significant correlation between incumbent size and internationalization, 
though this is not seen in 2003 and 2006. It appears that larger firms had the edge when 
embarking on internationalization strategies in the earlier period. However, since no 
correlations were found between liberalization and internationalization, no evidence for 
hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5 was detected.  
Table 4. 
    Internationalisation and Entry regulation Internationalisation and Vertical integration
1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006
E.On 2 4 4 1 1 1
EDF 1 4 4 2 2 1
RWE 1 4 4 1 1 1
Enel ++ 1 1 3 2 3 3
Endesa ++ 4 4 4 1 4 4
Electrabel** 0 1 2  3 1
Iberdrola * 3 3 3 3 3 3
Scottish Power* 3 4 4 3 4 4
Vattenfall 3 4 4 3 1 1
EnBW 1 3 3 3 3 2
National Grid 3 4 4 3 4 4
Unión Fenosa 3 4 4 3 4 4
EDP 1 3 4 3 3 1
Essent 3 3 3 3 3 3
Dong Energy  3 4 4 2 4 4
Fortum 4 4 4 1 1 1
EVN 1 3 4 2 3 4
Valid cases 16 17 17 16 17 17
Based on Squared Euclidean Distance and Average Distance among groups
1. Low  internationalisation and low  liberalisation 1. High international & high integration
2. High internationalisation and low  liberalisation 2. Low  international and high Integration
3. Low  internationalisation and high liberalisation 3. Low  international and low  integration
4. High internationalisation and high liberalization 4. High international and low  integration
Cluster Membership of EU Electricity Multinationals: Internationalisation, Entry regulation and Vertical 
Integration 1999, 2003 and 2006 
 
Next, cluster analysis is applied in order to detect any patterns in incumbent 
internationalization, considering the same variables and time period as previously. 
Results are shown in Table 4. The relationship between internationalization and entry 
regulation is first analysed, shown on the left part of Table 4. In 1999, the most 
internationalized of incumbents fell into two clusters. On the one hand were those 
incumbents which internationalized strongly whilst entry regulation was also 
liberalized, Fortum and Endesa, forming cluster 4. E.ON, in contrast, stands out for its 
aggressive internationalization in the context of low entry regulation liberalization. As 
in telecoms, the leader incumbent internationalizers emerged from contexts where 
liberalization is both less and more advanced. E.ON could be compared to Telefónica in 
its pursuit of ambitious internationalization from a relatively closed market. Most 
incumbents pursued relatively cautious internationalization programmes in 1999. There 
were two similarly-sized clusters of incumbents here: cluster 3 where liberalization was 
more advanced, and cluster 1 where this was delayed. Included in cluster 3 were 
Spanish regional incumbents (Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa) and in cluster 1 were 
German regional incumbents (RWE and EnBW). These Spanish and German 
incumbents had much lower internationalization levels than Endesa and E.ON 
respectively. This suggests that even a national-sectoral approach cannot account for the 
variety of firm strategies adopted. Rather, varieties of response are located at the firm 
level. Finally, most incumbents pursued internationalization slowly; only five of 
seventeen incumbents were pursuing internationalization with great enthusiasm in 1999.  
 
Attention is now turned to the other liberalization indicator, vertical integration, shown 
on the right-hand side of Table 4. Cluster 1 comprises incumbents which made over-
the-average progress unbundling and where internationalization was stronger: Fortum, 
Endesa, E.ON and RWE.
9
 As mentioned previously and in common with telecoms, the 
vast majority of electricity incumbents were slow to internationalise in 1999. In both 
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 In the 1999 cluster analysis of internationalization and entry regulation RWE was 
included in the cluster of lower internationalized and lower liberalized firms: however, 
in the cluster showing internationalization and vertical integration, it falls into the group 
of more highly internationalised firms based in countries which are slower to unbundle. 
 
telecoms and electricity, only a minority of incumbents were already strongly 
internationalised by 1999. Of the lesser internationalised incumbents, three fell into 
cluster 2, where unbundling is progressing slowly; the bulk (eight) fall into cluster 3, 
where unbundling is being pursued.  
 
How did these incumbents evolve over the next seven years? Analysis is first turned to 
internationalization and entry regulation. By 2006, there is some convergence in the 
sense that all incumbents bar one, Electrabel, which is discussed below, are in either 
cluster 3 or 4, both of which are characterised by high liberalization. Of these 
incumbents, cluster 4 is the dominant one, grouping 12 incumbents that 
internationalized strongly – following the pattern set by Fortum and Endesa – based in 
home markets where entry regulation is liberalised. The second largest cluster, 3, is 
composed of four incumbents, grouping incumbents which internationalised less though 
from liberalized environments (Enel, Iberdrola, EnBW and Essent). Interestingly, two 
of these more ‘hesitant’ internationalizers, Iberdrola and Enel have, since 2006, 
completed huge acquisitions. In 2007, Iberdrola took over Scottish Power, whilst in 
2009, Enel took over Endesa. It seems that the ‘hesitant’ internationalizers ‘bided their 
time’ until they made their move to acquire more internationalised incumbents, 
absorbing all their international business. Chronologically, the UK was the first of the 
three to liberalise entry, followed by Spain with Italy trailing behind. From this 
perspective, a ‘wait-and-see’ logic may have proved advantageous: slower liberalisers 
took advantage of incumbents in countries had had liberalised previously. The wave of 
massive Mergers and Acquisitions reflects the fact that the EU electricity market is 
characterised by monopolistic competition, and that market integration is resulting in 
domination by a small number of huge Multinationals. Belgium’s traditionally private 
Electrabel was the main exception to the rule. Here, a defensive strategy was at work. 
Electrabel pursued an ambitious internationalization programme between 1999 and 
2006 as the government delayed market opening. Fears about the incumbent’s 
vulnerability were proved correct when immediately, on opening the market, Electrabel 
was snapped up by Suez, after which both were merged with Gaz de France to form one 
of Europe’s largest multi-utilities (Bauby and Varone 2007).  
 
As regards internationalization and vertical integration, the most internationalized of 
electricity incumbents are divided up nearly equally into two clusters, since, whilst 
entry regulation liberalization was nearly complete in 2006, progress on unbundling was 
mixed. First, there was a group of seven highly internationalised incumbents based in 
countries where unbundling was more advanced (cluster 4). This included National 
Grid, Scottish Power, Endesa, Unión Fenosa, Dong Energy and EVN. These 
incumbents were able to internationalise as both entry regulation and unbundling were 
implemented. Second, a group of six incumbents (cluster 1) pursued significant 
internationalisation expansion, in a context of liberalised entry but delayed unbundling 
(E.ON, EDF, RWE, Vattenfall, EDP, and Fortum). The main exception was Electrabel, 
which had delayed both forms of liberalization, as previously explained. So, Finland’s 
Fortum, which in 1999 seemed to be setting the pace for internationalization in the 
context of advanced liberalization, and saw its foreign revenues increase over seven 
years from 32% 73%, did so whilst unbundling remained stagnant. A similar 
observation can be made of the other cluster members. A third cluster, 3, comprises 
three incumbents whose internationalization was somewhat slower in a context of 
greater progress unbundling. EnBW is alone in cluster 2, enjoying higher vertical 
integration but less internationalization. Here, it can be seen how Iberdrola and EnBW, 
operating in the same policy environment as their other highly internationalized Spanish 
and German peers, were both much slower to internationalise. Again, diversity is 
beyond national and sectoral patterns, it is ultimately located at the firm level.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL PATTERNS IN 
TELECOMS AND ELECTRICITY 
 
Regulatory reforms defined broadly as liberalization were a prerequisite for the rise of 
telecoms and energy Multinationals. The internationalization of EU incumbents could 
not have taken place without liberalization of entry regulation and would have been 
difficult without progress on unbundling and privatization. However, on the ground, it is 
highly unlikely that all countries implement liberalization in precisely the same way at 
the same moment. The perception that some countries behave asymmetrically, by 
delaying or restricting liberalization whilst promoting ‘national champions’ to takeover 
other countries’ strategic ‘jewels in the crown’, is a considerable source of tension in the 
EU. A clearer understanding of State and firm response to liberalization helps shed light 
on the political economy of market integration.  
 
Three main hypotheses on the relationship between internationalization and 
liberalization were established. The first hypothesis predicted that those incumbents 
most exposed to earlier and deeper liberalization would be those which internationalized 
most. The second argument predicted that incumbents would pressurise States to restrict 
or delay liberalization, so those with secure financial and political resources would be 
most able to embark on high-risk adventures abroad. Correlation was used to test these 
hypotheses, and it was confirmed that no evidence existed on a direct relationship 
between internationalization and liberalization or ownership. Hypotheses 1 and 2 (and 
secondary hypotheses 4 and 5) were rejected.  
 
Attention was then turned to hypothesis 3, which, asserting the importance of 
institutional diversity, anticipated that countries and sectors would pursue various routes 
toward liberalization and internationalization, though often moving towards a similar 
point. Cluster analysis was used to reveal a diversity of responses to liberalization and 
internationalization. In general, this diversity can be organised at the country level, with 
modifications for sectors and, also, for firms. Countries and firms can be organised into 
larger and smaller ones.  
 
The Single Market led to the emergence of Multinationals in telecommunications and 
electricity from Western Europe; Eastern Europe was a recipient. The large continental 
countries, particularly France and Germany, dominated the battle for precedence in 
assuring their respective national incumbents would dominate European Multinationals 
in both sectors. Neither were liberalization ‘pace-setters’ nor were they consistent 
‘laggards’: rather, they were ‘middle-of-the-roaders’. France was slower than average to 
liberalize electricity, whilst E.ON’s early internationalization occurred in near 
monopolistic conditions. In telecoms, France moved to liberalise at an average pace; 
Germany was somewhat faster. Spain and Italy took strides to join them: Telefónica 
emerged as a leading world Multinational in near monopoly conditions, though Spain 
was among the ‘pace-setters’ liberalizing electricity. Relatively faster liberalization did 
not prevent Endesa from emerging as a leading European Multinational, though 
Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa were more hesitant to internationalize. Italy was somewhat 
slower to implement liberalization and its incumbents were slower to go abroad, 
nevertheless, Enel and Telecom Italia occupied positions in the top five by 2006. The 
most international of the EU’s Multinational telecoms and electricity incumbents 
emerged from the larger continental economies: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. 
Though there were no automatic relations between the timing and extent of 
liberalization and incumbent internationalization, the large part of these Multinationals 
came about more thanks to a slower or middle-of-the-road approach to liberalization 
than a faster one. The UK took a different path: it embraced liberalization 
enthusiastically, acting prior to EC directives in both sectors. Today, UK incumbents do 
not dominate the EU Multinational rankings in these sectors. In telecommunications, 
BT sacrificed its domination of the rankings, de-internationalising in order to prioritise 
its home market. The UK now presents itself as a highly attractive site for investment: 
Telefónica’s O2 has already overtaken Vodafone in the UK, and proposed mergers 
between Orange and T-Mobile, and France Télécom and Deutsche Telekom would put 
Vodafone further down the UK ranking (Parker 2009). In electricity, Scottish Power 
was taken over by Iberdrola.  
 
Among the smaller economies, the Nordic countries constituted a close group. In 
general, these countries liberalised earlier, whilst incumbents responded enthusiastically 
to internationalization options, though on a sub-regional basis. In electricity, this was 
because a trade pooling system existed; in telecommunications, the ‘star’ 
internationaliser, Telenor, earned 23% of foreign revenue from other Nordic countries, 
12% from Eastern Europe and 30% from beyond Europe. In telecommunications, 
Norway liberalised more slowly than Sweden, Finland and Denmark, and its 
investments beyond Europe were high, hence Telenor’s comparison with Telefónica. 
Defensive patterns dominated behaviour of many of the other smaller economies. In 
Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal, liberalization was implemented relatively slowly, 
and incumbents internationalised though quite cautiously. In Belgium, the efforts to 
protect Electrabel via slow liberalization ultimately failed. Austria was bolder to 
liberalize and its incumbents to internationalise, particularly focusing on the markets in 
East Europe.  
 
Internationalization patterns of EU incumbents in telecoms and electricity are best 
explained using comparative political economy lenses, whereby country and sectoral 
trends, interwoven with the firm-level, provide a superior explanation for the outcome 
of market integration in these critical sectors. 
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Annex I 
 
Correlation techniques were used to test for the relationship between incumbent 
internationalization, liberalization and privatization, controlling for incumbent size in 
1999, 2003 and 2006. Bivariate Pearson’s correlation coefficients were run to determine 
the degree of relationships among the predictors and incumbent internationalisation 
(Table A.1 tests electricity, Table A.3, telecommunications).  
 
Table A.1: Bivariate Pearson’s correlations between Electricity Incumbent Internationalisation, Entry 
Regulation, Vertical Integration, Privatization and Size (Revenues and Employees) 1999, 2003 and 2006. 
1999  
Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration 
Internationalization Pearson Correlation 0.666** 0.596* -0.090 0.325 -0.030 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.005) (0.015) (0.740) (0.219) (0.911) 
Revenues  Pearson Correlation  0.967** -0.469 0.205 0.137 
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.067) (0.447) (0.612) 
Employees Pearson Correlation   -0.540* 0.085 0.234 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.031) (0.753) (0.382) 
Entry Regulation 
 
Pearson Correlation    0.173 -0.543* 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.523) (0.030) 
Privatization Pearson Correlation     -0.680** 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.004) 
2003  Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration 
Internationalization Pearson Correlation 0.049 0.057 0.317 0.191 -0.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.852) (0.829) (0.215) (0.463) (0.986) 
Revenues  Pearson Correlation  0.895** -0.418 0.132 0.381 
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.095) (0.614) (0.132) 
Employees Pearson Correlation   -0.287 -0.038 0.515* 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.264) (0.884) (0.035) 
Entry Regulation 
 
Pearson Correlation    -0.152 -0.106 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.560) (0.685) 
Privatization Pearson Correlation     -0.352 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.165) 
2006  Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration 
Internationalization Pearson Correlation 0.068 0.097 0.030 -0.100 0.333 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.796) (0.710) (0.908) (0.702) (0.192) 
Revenues  Pearson Correlation  0.888** -0.025 0.209 0.417 
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.923) (0.420) (0.096) 
Employees Pearson Correlation   -0.030 -0.019 0.397 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.910) (0.943) (0.115) 
Entry Regulation 
 
Pearson Correlation    -0.060 -0.269 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.820) (0.296) 
Privatization Pearson Correlation     0.061 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.818) 
Notes:  N=16.  * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level 
(2-tailed). 
 
We also conducted Kendall rank correlation (a non-parametric test) and Spearman rank 
correlation (a non-parametric test to measure the degree of association between 
variables). In general, Kendall and Spearman correlations show similar results, so, only 
Kendall correlations are shown (Table A.2 for electricity, Table A.4 for 
telecommunications). 
 
Table A.2: Kendall correlations for Electricity Incumbent Internationalisation, Market Entry, Privatisation, 
Vertical Integration and size of the firms (Revenues and Employees).   
 
1999  
Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration 
Internationalization Correlation Coefficient 0.314 0.461* -0.081 0.203 -0.049 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.108) (0.018) (0.697) (0.330) (0.825) 
Revenues  Correlation Coefficient  0.750** -0.303 0.156 0.000 
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.125) (0.429) (1,000) 
Employees Correlation Coefficient   -0.284 0.138 0.022 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.149) (0.485) (0.916) 
Entry Regulation Correlation Coefficient    0.152 -0.573* 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.472) (0.011) 
Privatization Correlation Coefficient     -0.609** 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.007) 
2003  
Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration 
Internationalization Correlation Coefficient 0.044 0.148 0.236 0.236 0.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.804) (0.409) (0.241) (0.218) (1,000) 
Revenues  Correlation Coefficient  0.691** -0.479* 0.218 0.145 
Sig. (2-tailed) . (0.000) (0.017) (0.252) (0.481) 
Employees Correlation Coefficient   -0.440* 0.218 0.241 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.028) (0.252) (0.240) 
Entry Regulation Correlation Coefficient    -0.172 -0.282 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . (0.423) (0.224) 
Privatization Correlation Coefficient     -0.254 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.248) 
2006  
Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration 
Internationalization Correlation Coefficient 0.097 0.097 0.132 0.025 0.319 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.591) (0.591) (0.529) (0.898) (0.134) 
Revenues  Correlation Coefficient  0.779** -0.336 0.234 0.364 
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.103) (0.219) (0.083) 
Employees Correlation Coefficient   -0.259 0.234 0.283 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.210) (0.219) (0.178) 
Entry Regulation Correlation Coefficient    0.128 -0.195 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.563) (0.426) 
Privatization Correlation Coefficient     0.067 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.767) 
Notes: N=16, * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
 
 
Table A.3: Bivariate Pearson’s correlations between Telecoms Incumbent Internationalisation, Entry 
Regulation, Market Structure, Privatization and Size (Revenues and Employees) 1999, 2003 and 2006. 
1999  
Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Internationalization Pearson Correlation 
0.073 0.151 0.264 0.479 0.184 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(0.812) (0.623) (0.383) (0.097) (0.547) 
Revenues  Pearson Correlation 
 0.958** 0.404 0.383 0.587* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 (0.000) (0.171) (0.196) (0.035) 
Employees Pearson Correlation   
0.361 0.263 0.492 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.226) (0.386) (0.088) 
Entry Regulation 
 
Pearson Correlation    
-0.106 0.459 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.730) (0.115) 
Privatization Pearson Correlation     
0.386 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.193) 
2003  Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Internationalization Pearson Correlation 
0.112 0.186 .a -0.236 -0.230 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(0.715) (0.542) 
. 
(0.437) (0.449) 
Revenues  Pearson Correlation  
0.977** .a 0.009 0.170 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
(0.000) 
. 
(0.977) (0.580) 
Employees Pearson Correlation   
.a -0.023 0.100 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . 
(0.939) (0.746) 
Entry Regulation 
 
Pearson Correlation    
.a .a 
Sig. (2-tailed)    . . 
Privatization Pearson Correlation     
0.067 
Sig. (2-tailed)     
(0.827) 
2006  Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Internationalization Pearson Correlation 
0.292 0.338 .a -0.112 -0.188 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(0.333) (0.258) 
. 
(0.716) (0.538) 
Revenues  Pearson Correlation  
0.985** .a 0.091 0.154 
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) 
. 
(0.768) (0.616) 
Employees Pearson Correlation   
.a 0.086 0.130 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . (0.780) (0.671) 
Entry Regulation 
 
Pearson Correlation    
.a .a 
Sig. (2-tailed)    . . 
Privatization Pearson Correlation     
0.047 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.879) 
Notes: N=12. * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
 
Table A.4: Kendall correlations among Telecom Incumbent Internationalisation, Entry Regulation, 
Privatisation, Market Structure and Size (Revenues and Employees).  
1999  
Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Internationalization Correlation Coefficient 
0.000 0.105 0.273 0.040 0.184 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(1.000) (0.622) (0.274) (0.853) (0.389) 
Revenues  Correlation Coefficient  
0.718** 0.531* 0.248 0.538* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
(0.001) (0.030) (0.243) (0.010) 
Employees Correlation Coefficient   
0.435 0.092 0.410 
Sig. (2-tailed)   
(0.076) (0.667) (0.051) 
Entry Regulation Correlation Coefficient    
-0.098 0.483* 
Sig. (2-tailed)    
(0.691) (0.048) 
Privatization Correlation Coefficient     0.275 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.197) 
2003  
Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Internationalization Correlation Coefficient 
0.144 0.170 .a -0.122 -0.177 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(0.500) (0.425) 
. 
(0.575) (0.419) 
Revenues  Correlation Coefficient  
0.821** .a 0.160 0.107 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
(0.000) 
. 
(0.457) (0.621) 
Employees Correlation Coefficient   
.a 0.294 0.053 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . 
(0.172) (0.805) 
Entry Regulation Correlation Coefficient    
.a .a 
Sig. (2-tailed)    . . 
Privatization Correlation Coefficient     
0.000 
Sig. (2-tailed)     
(1.000) 
2006  
Revenues   Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Internationalization Correlation Coefficient 
0.234 0.260 .a -0.135 -0.130 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(0.270) (0.221) 
. 
(0.534) (0.540) 
Revenues  Correlation Coefficient  
0.821** .a 0.187 0.026 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
(0.000) 
. 
(0.385) (0.903) 
Employees Correlation Coefficient   
.a 0.187 0.000 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . 
(0.385) (1.000) 
Entry Regulation Correlation Coefficient    
.a .a 
Sig. (2-tailed)    . . 
Privatization Correlation Coefficient     
0.000 
Sig. (2-tailed)     
(1.000) 
Notes: N=12, * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
 
